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A COOPERATIVE CONUNDRUM? THE
NAALC AND MEXICAN MIGRANT
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES
Robert Russo*
"[It] is a bad joke.. .a Rube Goldberg structure of committees all leading
nowhere."'
I. INTRODUCTIONSINCE its adoption in 1993 at the insistence of U.S. President Bill
Clinton's administration, the labor side accords to the North Amer-
ican Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been extensively ex-
amined, occasionally ridiculed, and often dismissed as irrelevant. Most
analysis tends to focus on the disappointing results of the North Ameri-
can Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) in affecting meaningful
changes in the conditions of workers in Mexico.2 In this article, I aim to
take a different approach. My analysis focuses instead primarily on the
efficacy of the NAALC process when complaints are made about alleged
labor law violations in the United States. To provide some context for
this analysis, I will briefly examine two recent complaints submitted to
the NAALC's National Administrative Office (NAO) in the United
States regarding the rights of Mexican migrant workers in U.S. territory.
The central contention of this article is that the NAALC offers disap-
pointing results when applied against the United States as well, due to a
fundamental conflict in the functioning of the NAALC within regional
economic integration that encourages increased labor migration.
A re-examination of the NAALC is also timely because it is portrayed
by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico as expanding the "legal framework for
affirming the human rights and employment opportunities of migrant
*Robert Russo, LL.B., LL.M. is a Ph.D. Candidate, and Faculty of Law at the Uni-
versity of British Columbia. Contact information: 778-991-6310 (phone) or
rmrusso@gmail.com (e-mail).
1. Lane Kirkland commenting on the North American Agreement on Labour Coop-
eration negotiated by the Clinton Administration as a side accord to NAFTA. See
Frank Swoboda, Kirkland: No Compromise On NAFTA-AFL-CIA Head Warns
Labor Will 'Go For Broke' To Defeat Treaty, WASH. Post, Sept. 1, 1993, at F3.
2. See generally Griselda Vega, Maquiladora's Lost Women: The Killing Fields of
Mexico-Are NAFTA and NAALC Providing the Needed Protection? 4 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 137 (2000-2001); Roy J. Adams & Parbudyal Singh, Early Experi-
ence with NAFTA's Labour Side Accord 18 CoMr. LAB. L.J. 161 (1996-1997); Jef-
frey R. Armstrong, A Seat at the Table: A Critical Analysis of the Right to Foreign
Nation Parens Patriae Standing 17 FLA. J. INT'l L. 39 (2005).
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workers in the Hemisphere."3 The parties to the NAALC have used its
existing administrative mechanisms for recent labor agreements that are
part of free trade negotiations.4 All three NAALC parties have in recent
years created government offices dedicated to administering international
labor affairs, a development that built upon the government mechanisms
and institutions that were created for the NAALC in 1994.5 These insti-
tutions are expanding within a legal framework being developed through-
out the hemisphere and illustrate that the principle of linking labor
standards to trade negotiations is in the process of becoming a customary
part of trade negotiations throughout the Western Hemisphere. 6
II. LINKING LABOR STANDARDS TO TRADE: A SHORT
EXPLANATION OF THE NAALC PROCESS
Protection of labor rights through trade agreements requires defining
what types of labor rights will be protected, and whether those rights will
be based on national definitions or international labor standards.7 The
NAALC is not a part of the NAFTA agreement and it does not have
many of the remedies and enforcement mechanisms available under the
3. Au AN JURY, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGES AND MIGRATION, U.S. DerT.
OF STATE, IMPLEMENIATION OF THE 1998 SANTIAGO SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS
MIGRANT WORKER INITIATIVE, available at http://www.eclac.org/celade/proyectos/
migracion/Jury.doc.
4. For example, the U.S. National Administrative Office was recently renamed the
"Office of Trade Agreement Implementation" with a corresponding mandate to
act as a contact point for the to help administer the labor provisions of free trade
agreements with Chile and Singapore "as well as labor provisions of other free
trade agreements to which the United States may become a party." See Notice of
Renaming the National Administrative Office as the Office of Trade Agreement,
59 Fed. Reg. 77127-31 (Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/pro-
grams/nao/propguide.htm.
5. The United States has its "International Labor Affairs Bureau" located within its
Department of Labor. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs,
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/contacts/main.htm (last visited July 22, 2010). Canada
has its "International Labour Affairs Office" located within Human Resources So-
cial Development Canada. See Human Resources and Skills Development Ca-
nada, International Labor Affairs, http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/labour
globalization/ila/index.shtml (last visited July 22, 2010). Mexico has its section
called Cooperation Laboral Internacional located within the Secretaria del Trabajo
y Previsi6n Social. See Unidad de Asuntos Internacionals, http://www.stps.gob.mx/
01_oficina/03_cgai/index.html (last visited July 23, 2010).
6. The United States has incorporated core ILO labour rights into its subsequent
Free Trade negotiations with Central American countries. See L3R. OF CONG.,
ORDER CoDE RS22823, OVERVIEW OF LABOUR ENFORCEMENRI ISSUES IN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS (2008). Canada has a stated policy of negotiating labour and
environmental cooperation accords in tandem with free trade agreements. See
Emma Lavoie-Evans, Canada's Free Trade Agreements with Latin America, May
2010, http://www.nsi-ins.ca/english/pdflFTA%20backgrounder.pdf. In 1997, Mex-
ico and the European Union signed a free trade agreement titled "Economic Part-
nership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement" which addressed,
among other issues, labour and human rights issues between the two parties. See
Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, art. 1,
36, Oct. 8, 1997, 2000 OJ. (L276) 45.
7. Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements: An Analytical
Guide, 10:13 INr'i L. & POi. 13, 15 (2003).
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NAFTA. 8 Nor does the NAALC utilize international labor standards
created by the International Labor Organization (ILO). 9 Instead, all
three countries that are a party to the NAALC undertake to provide and
effectively enforce their own labor laws.' 0 Labor laws must incorporate
the eleven principles outlined in the NAALC, including the protection of
migrant workers and related labor issues."
There is a wide spectrum of enforceability of labor standards, ranging
from fully enforceable labor obligations enjoying equal status to other
aspects of a trade agreement to simple pronouncements announced by
the parties that contain no enforcement mechanisms for any failures to
comply.1 2 The NAALC clearly states that nothing in the Agreement em-
powers a Party's authorities to undertake any activities relating to labor
law enforcement in the territory of another Party to the Agreement.13
The NAALC does not thus create an opportunity for extraterritorial en-
forcement by one state within another state's territory, nor does it create
a "supranational enforcement system."1 4 Instead the NAALC utilizes a
review and dispute resolution system that has never led to any complaints
going beyond the ministerial consultation phase.' 5 Any complaints made
by a government, organization, or individual under the auspices of the
NAALC are handled through a National Administrative Office (NAO)
that each state party has created within its own labor department. 16 A
complaint against one NAALC party can be made in the NAO office of
either (or both) of the other parties.' 7
The establishment and functioning of the NAOs illustrate the inequal-
ity inherent among the parties in the NAALC arrangement. In theory,
they are equal national bodies. In practice, the select definition of labor
rights combined with the disproportionate influence enjoyed by the
United States over Mexico in their trading relationship illustrates the
general imbalance in the relationship. The NAALC treats violations of
its 11 principles in differing ways, limiting the various levels of remedies
available for violations.18 There is no possibility of fines, arbitral panels,
or even mandatory Ministerial Consultations in cases involving migrant
workers' protection.19 In effect, by using a selective process to determine
8. See generally North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), U.S.-
Mex.-Can., art. 42, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1513.
11. Id. at 1515.
12. Polaski, supra note 7, at 19.
13. NAALC, supra note 8, at 1513.
14. Boin HEPIU, LABOUR LAWS AN) GLOBAi- TRADF 109 (2005).
15. Id. at 110-111. There are provisions for trade sanctions for violations of certain
labor principles in the NAALC (occupational safety and health, child labour, and
minimum wage "technical labour standards") but in practice these have never
been used.
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what remedies are available for different violations of labor standards,
the NAALC has created a "hierarchy among rights and obligations" that
has reduced the ability to "promote, to the maximum extent possible, the
[NAALC Labor Principles];... [and] promote compliance with, and effec-
tive enforcement by each Party of, its labor law." 20
The relatively small number of submissions filed under the NAALC
during its operation (twenty-five submissions in twenty-five years) has
been explained by some advocates of the agreement as a part of the
NAALC procedural emphasis on long-term cooperative outcomes.21
But, the lack of submissions may be generally attributed to the NAALC's
"soft law" procedures which, while shining an international spotlight on
U.S. labor law violations, nevertheless do not result in the rapid resolu-
tion of disputes.22 The three NAALC parties consistently emphasize the
cooperative nature of the agreement when responding to issues related to
complaints.23 This cooperative process has the practical effect of further-
ing the interests of the United States in regulating the labor standards of
a developing country such as Mexico, while maintaining the veneer of an
equal relationship through consultation and cooperative activities al-
though such activities rarely result in modifications to labor laws that af-
fect the developed country.
III. LEGAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LABOR
STANDARDS TO MIGRANT WORKERS
Although the NAALC references migrant workers, it does not include
a specific definition for them in the agreement, so it is necessary to turn
to other sources for a definition. A migrant worker is defined under in-
ternational law as "a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been
engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a
national." 24 The ILO estimates there to be approximately ninety-six mil-
lion migrant workers globally. 25
The reasons behind the movement of migrant workers include typical
ones, such as desire to travel or reunite with family, or to earn a living
wage. International labor migration has been seen both as a source of
"growth and prosperity to both host and source countries" and a positive
20. HUMAN Ricirrs WATCH, LABOR RIGEIrS AND TRADE: GUIDANCE FOR THE
UNIED STATE-S IN TRADE AccomDo NEGOTIATIONs (2002), available at http://
www.hrw.org/legacy/press/2002/10/laborrights-bck.htm.
21. HEvru3, supra note 14, at 109.
22. Lance Compa, NAFTA's Labor Side Agreement and International Labor Solidar-
ity, 33:3 Antipode: A Radical Journal of Geography 451, 453 (2001) available at
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=
articles.
23. Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Cooperation, NAALC-Cooperative Ac-
tivities, http://www.naalc.org/coop-activities.htm (last visited on Aug. 16, 2010).
24. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, art. 2 (Dec. 18, 1990).
25. ILO, Current Dynamics of international Labour Migration: Globalisation and Re-
gional Integration, http://ilo-mirror.library.cornell.edulpublic/english/protection/
migrant/aboutlindex.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2005).
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outcome of regional economic integration.26 But for many migrant work-
ers, the dark side of globalization has resulted in societal inequity and a
complete loss of opportunities and human rights protection. A rising
number of workers in developing countries migrate because they feel
they have been left with no alternative.27 Increasing regional economic
integration has led to concerns regarding the rising exploitation of mi-
grant workers, particularly in cases where those workers should be pro-
tected under agreements negotiated in tandem with free trade
arrangements. 28 The difficulty in offering protections to migrant workers
through an agreement, such as the NAALC, is that exploitation of mi-
grant workers does occur in the destination country, usually a developed
country. 29 The resistance by developed countries to international intru-
sion on this issue is in conflict with attempts made through instruments,
such as the NAALC, to enforce migrant workers' rights.30
A. CLARIFYING THE TERM "MIGRANT WORKER" WITHIN
THE NAALC CONTEXT
The NAALC states that the Parties must provide "migrant workers in a
Party's territory with the same legal protection as the Party's nationals in
respect of working conditions."3 The United States interprets the cus-
tomary international law definition of "migrant worker" to exclude un-
documented migrants. In 2002, a 5-4 majority in the U.S. Supreme Court
case, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. National Labor Relations Board,
held that undocumented workers who had been fired for union organiz-
ing activities were violating provisions of the 1986 Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) and were not legally entitled to all protections
available to legally documented workers under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 3 2 In September 2003, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights held in an Advisory Opinion-meant in part to respond to the Hoff-
man decision-that the rights to equality and non-discriminatory treatment
are jus cogens and applicable to any resident of a state regardless of that
resident's immigration status.33 The United States nevertheless has so far
26. Id.
27. Kathy Richards, The Trafficking of Migrant Workers: What are the Links Between
Labour Trafficking and Corruption?, 42 Iwr'L MIGRATION 147, 151 (2004).
28. Id. at 150-51.
29. See id. at 149.
30. See id. (showing that as of August 2009, no destination country for migrant work-
ers has ratified the International Convention On The Protection Of The Rights Of
All Migrant Workers And Members Of Their Families).
31. NAALC, supra note 8, at Annex 1, Principle 11.
32. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). See generally
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1107 (2006); see
also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). In his dissent,
Justice Stephen Breyer noted that the legislative history of the IRCA indicated
that the Congress, in 1986, had clearly not intended to strip illegal aliens of all
protections available under federal employment statutes. Hoffnan Plastic, 535
U.S. at 153.
33. Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Advisory Opinion, OC-18/03 (2003) ("In the area of labor law, the United
2011] 31
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refused to extend protections to undocumented migrant workers. The
NAALC complaints referenced in the two case studies below refer only
to the legally admitted migrant workers inside American territory.
B. NATIONAL LEGISLATION TO PROTECT MIGRANT WORKERS
One of the basic principles with respect to labor standards developed
for migrant workers is that of equal treatment for all migrant workers and
application of the same standards as those "applie[d] to nationals of the
State of employment. .. "34 U.S. legislation to protect documented mi-
grant workers exists in the form of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural
Worker Protection Act (MSPA) 35 and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 36 Minimum wages and workers' deductions are covered under
this legislation to ensure that migrant workers are not paid below the
federal minimum wage.37 Many problems have arisen in enforcing these
laws, which American authorities often attribute to a lack of resources in
enforcement. The U.S. Department of Labor has admitted that it cannot
adequately investigate or prosecute allegations of abuse in markets as
large and diverse as the domestic workers and agricultural fields.38
An analysis of forced labor conditions existing for migrant workers in
the Florida citrus industry indicated the prevalence of coercive measures
taken against immigrant agricultural workers from Mexico and Guate-
mala, who often worked for no pay or for wages far below minimum
wage. 39 Another difficulty with the use of national legislation to regulate
the rights of migrant workers is the reluctance of prosecutors to take on
cases involving violations of migrant workers' rights as it has been histori-
cally difficult to prove criminal violations of certain laws regarding invol-
untary servitude.40 The NAALC has opened the door for civil society
organizations to become involved in complaints and to press for investi-
States does not treat irregular migrants with equality before the law. . .This dis-
criminatory treatment of irregular migrants is contrary to international law. Using
cheap labor without ensuring workers their basic human rights is not a legitimate
immigration policy."); Int'l Labour Conference, Geneva, Switz., 2004, Towards A
Fair Deal For Migrant Workers In The Global Economy, at 79 (stating that the
ruling "clearly reinforces the application of international labour standards to non-
national workers, particularly those of irregular status").
34. Towards A Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy, supra note 33,
at 42; see also International Labour Organization Convention, Geneva, Switz.,
June 4, 1975, Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, $ 12;
G.A. Res. 45/158, 1 25 (1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
35. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1801, et
seq. (2003).
36. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (2003).
37. Kevin Bales, et al., Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23 BERKELEY
J. INT-'L L. 47, 63 (2005).
38. Id. at 64.
39. Id. at 64-65.
40. Wendell Rawls Jr., Migrant Slavery Persists in Southeast Farms, N.Y. TIMis, Nov.
19, 1981 at Al.
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gations.4 1 This is what occurred in May 2000 when a Florida-based NGO
called the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW) began investigating
the employment conditions of migrant workers employed by R&A Har-
vesting after receiving information about migrant farm worker abuse by
the company. 42 CIW urged the U.S. Justice Department "to investigate
what seemed to be a clear case of forced labor in Florida's citrus groves";
however federal investigators "initially declined to pursue the case be-
cause, without adequate resources to investigate, they felt they could not
prove involuntary servitude without victims who would be willing to tes-
tify." 4 3 The inability (or unwillingness) to devote sufficient resources to
deal with these problems continues despite much evidence pointing to
large scale labor rights violations of migrant workers within the United
States.
The failure of international pressure to force American compliance
with international labor rulings points to a larger problem. International
labor rights conventions can raise awareness of rights abuses and shame
countries into action, but as they currently exist they are not designed to
coerce states into enforcement of existing national labor laws. The issue
of poor enforcement of U.S. labor laws when confronted with violations
of migrant worker rights is one that the NAALC is meant to directly ad-
dress; but the lack of coercive measures within the agreement severely
limits its relevance to protecting migrant workers' legal rights. The fol-
lowing case studies illustrate the methods with which the NAALC deals
with these complaints regarding Mexican migrant workers rights' in the
United States. They reveal a similar pattern of resistance on the part of
the United States when faced with unexpected complaints regarding la-
bor rights violations arising from a developing country's concerns.
1. Case Study #1-Mexican NAO 2003-1-Migrant Workers' Complaint
Against United States and North Carolina Employers
The issue of the U.S. H-2A Non-Immigrant Visa Program became the
subject of a public communication filed in February 2003 by two farm
workers' advocacy groups, who alleged that the H-2A program was dis-
criminatory, and that North Carolina employers exploited migrant work-
ers "by not paying overtime, blacklisting, and denying migrants access to
workers' compensation benefits." 4 4 In September 2003, the Mexican
41. Laura Macdonald, Civil Society and North American Integration, (Inst. for Re-
search on Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 2004-09e), available at http://www.irpp.
org/wp/archive/NA-integ/wp2004-09e.pdf.
42. Bales, supra note 37, at 81.
43. Id. It took additional work performed by CIW, and more than a year of subse-
quent investigations before charges were brought against R&A Harvesting.
44. Public Communication Submitted to the Mexican National Administrative Office
(NAO), http://www.naalc.org/english/summary-mexico.shtml (last visited July 22,
2010). The communication was submitted on May 27, 1998 by the Uni6n Nacional
de Trabajadores (UNT), Frente Aut6ntico del Trabajo (FAT), Frente Democratico
Campesino (FDC), and the Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Metdlica,
Acero, Hierro, Conexos y Similares (STIMACHS), assisted by the International
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NAO accepted the public communication for review and two weeks later
requested cooperative consultations with the U.S. NAO. 4 5
The significance of this petition is its main allegation that conditions for
many Mexican migrant workers in the United States have not substan-
tially improved since the demise of the Bracero guest worker program in
the early 1960s.4 6 The H visa that is the subject of this complaint "ex-
tended the realm of guest work past the end of the bracero era" but the
U.S. Congress importantly made a variety of guarantees to Mexican guest
workers through H-2A protections for "workers' wages, housing, travel
expenses, and access to free legal representation." 4 7 However, the H-2A
program has failed to stop unscrupulous growers from evading many of
their legal obligations through participation in the program. 4 8 Part of this
lies in the structure of the H-2A program regulations, which do not ex-
plicitly prohibit (or protect) unionization but instead "operate in a way
that discourages it."49 Petition Mexican NAO 2003-1 refers to growers
openly warning H-2A workers away from unions, and enforcing contrac-
tual bans against visitors to the fields or labor camps that keep workers
from talking to union organizers, issues that may violate guarantees
under both U.S. and International Law.50
In response to the petition, the U.S. Department of Labor concluded,
in its own investigation in 2004, that North Carolina had been enforcing
its laws properly.51 In December 2007, Mexico requested cooperative
consultations under Article 21 of the NAALC. 5 2 As of March 2010, the
Labor Rights Fund. The two farmworkers' advocacy groups who filed the com-
plaint were the Washington, D.C.-based Farmworker Justice Fund and the Mexico-
based farmworker advocacy group Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y
Campesinos.
45. Id.
46. The Bracero Program, http://www.farmworkers.org/bracerop.html (last visited July
22, 2010). In August 1942, the governments of the United States and Mexico insti-
tuted the Bracero program largely to respond to crop failures and insufficient agri-
cultural employment in Mexico during the late 1930s and early 1940s. This
situation coincided with a demand for cheap manual labor brought about the entry
of the United States into the Second World War. The Bracero Program suffered
from criticism that it countenanced racism and harsh labor conditions for Mexican
workers in the United States. The head of the U.S. Department of Labor, Lee G.
Williams, famously described the Bracero Program as a system of "legalized slav-
ery." ALICIA R. SCHMIDT CAMACIJO, MIGRANT IMAGINARIES: LATINo CuI-
TURAL PoLIrICS IN THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDERLANDS 110 (2008). The Bracero
Program was terminated in 1964.
47. Jennifer Gordon, Transnational Labor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 554
(2007).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 555.
50. Id.
51. Mexico Seen Using NAFTA Labor Deal to Press Immigration Issues, WASH.
TARIFF AND TRADE LE-ITER, May 10, 2004, at 2, 3. The article states that workers'
representatives in the complaint alleged that the number of H2-A workers has
increased 700-800% in the last decade.
52. Secretariat of the Comm'n for Labor Cooperation, 2004-2007 Report, available at
http://new.naalc.org/UserFiles/File/AnnualReports/FinalAR04-07En.pdf. The re-
port states that cooperative consultations were requested after Mexico studied its
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Mexican NAO has yet to provide a report of review on the submission. 53
This case was seen by some in the U.S. DOL and the U.S. National Advi-
sory Committee on the NAALC as an attempt by Mexico to impose its
views on immigration issues relating to its citizens working in the United
States through the NAALC. 54 The Advisory Committee heard from the
DOL Director in May 2004 and in turn Committee members "cautioned
that Mexico has a separate agenda in its investigations of the treatment of
migrant workers. Rather than just the enforcement of current laws, Mexico
wants to see changes in those laws."55 The DOL Director agreed with the
Committee stating that the complaint went "went way beyond the objec-
tives in the NAFTA accord" and that cooperative programs are in place
to deal with workers' complaints.56 Both departments avoided any dis-
cussion of punitive measures or of changes to any U.S. labor laws to com-
ply with NAALC rulings.
2. Case Study #2-Mexican NA 0-2005-1 -Rights of Migrant Workers
Under H-2B Visa Program in Idaho
In April 2005, the U.S. H-2B Visa program became the subject of a
public communication filed by migrant workers, several NGOs, and a
Law School to the Mexican NAO. The H-2B Visa facilitates the entry of
season Mexican workers into the United States.57 The complaint alleged
that migrant workers under the H-2B Visa program in Idaho were denied
protection against forced labor and minimum employment standards; had
suffered employment discrimination, including inequality in pay for wo-
men and men; and, had been exposed to occupational injuries and offered
inadequate compensation for those injuries.58
Another aspect to this public communication, untested under the
NAALC, deals with the inability of the migrant workers to secure free
legal assistance to enforce their rights under U.S. labor laws. In Idaho,
legal aid lawyers receive federal funding from the Legal Services Corpo-
ration (LSC) and lawyers receiving LSC funding are barred by federal
NAO complaints 2003-1 and 2005-1 under its domestic rules and found similarities
in the complaints.
53. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the NAALC, http://www.dol.gov/
ilab/programs/nao/status.htm (last visited on Aug. 16, 2010).
54. Id.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. H-2B visa, http://www.workpermit.com/us/employer h-2b.htm (last visited Aug.
11, 2010).
58. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Status of Submissions under the NAALC, March 2010, http:/
www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm. Lawyers working for the following
groups filed the complaint: the Northwest Workers' Justice Project, the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, and Andrade Law Of-
fice. Sixteen migrant workers from Panama, Mexico and Guatemala were joined
by nine U.S. and Mexican organizations in filing the complaint, including Centro
de Investigacion Laboral y Asesoria Sindical, A.C.; Frente Autentico del Trabajo;
National Union of Workers (UNT); Red Mexicana de Accion Frente al Libre Co-
mercio; Sin Fronteras, 1.A.P.; Idaho Migrant Council; National Immigration Law
Center; Oregon Law Center; and Pineros y Campesinos del Noroeste.
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law from representing several categories of immigrants, including those
who are in the U.S. on H-2B Visas.59 This case tested a specific principle
of the NAALC, which states that the United States must "enforce its laws
in connection with NAALC labor principles requiring: [the provision of]
migrant workers in [the United States'] territory with the same legal pro-
tection as [United States] nationals in respect of working conditions." 60
This case illustrated the difficulty migrant workers have in obtaining
legal representation in the United States. This is particularly true in re-
mote areas of states such as Idaho, where for a variety of factors, includ-
ing language and economic reasons, qualified private legal assistance is
not readily available. 61 Nevertheless, the need for migrant workers to
have access to proper legal representation is necessary to secure a variety
of rights related to their status. Only through the legal process can mi-
grant workers in the United States obtain a remedy under the federal
legislation such as the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protec-
tion Act, and litigation is much more likely to be successful when migrant
workers, often unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system and the English lan-
guage, are represented by legal counsel. 62
On October 24, 2007, the Mexican Labor Secretary responded to the
complaint, submitting some sixty-nine questions to the United States De-
partment of Labor dealing with issues relating to housing and transporta-
tion conditions for workers, wages, workers' access to legal assistance,
and the extent to which state and federal laws protect the rights of H-2B
workers from employer discrimination.63 In addition, the Mexican gov-
ernment requested the petitioners to reply to the same questions, with
the Brennan Center submitting its response on August 13, 2008, noting
that the two federal agencies responsible for protecting H-2B work-
ers-the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Home-
land Security-have failed to undertake any enforcement responsibilities
or investigations into the violations alleged in the complaint." Although,
as of August 2009, there is no response available from the U.S. Govern-
ment to the petition, members of the U.S. House of Representatives have
discussed the issue. On April 16, 2008, Democrat Representative George
Miller spoke before the House Judiciary Committee on the need for im-
proved legal reforms to ensure that H-2B workers receive proper legal
59. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, FAcT SFIEET: COMPLAINT TO MEXICAN GovERN-
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access to federally funded legal aid and are "not treated simply as a
cheap, easily-exploited source of labor."65
Both of the case studies in this article illustrate several key features of
the NAALC and its operating process. On the positive side, it acts to
engage non-governmental actors such as individual workers and human
rights groups into international legal processes, and to publicly acknowl-
edge problems in national programs designed to deal with migrant work-
ers. The effects of this should not be discounted because raising
awareness of migrant worker exploitation can eventually lead to political
or economic pressures from concerned American citizens to do some-
thing about the problem. But, as the cases demonstrate, the NAALC
process is inexcusably slow moving as a result of bureaucratic delays and
political considerations. Complaints to the NAALC have dragged on for
years, and usually wind up in the black hole of Ministerial Consultation
or Review. Expanding on Lane Kirkland's quote at the beginning of this
article, if the NAALC were a Rube Goldberg cartoon, it would be one
that would take years to finish and have an incomprehensible punch
line. 6 6 The limitations of the NAALC approach also illustrate the unwill-
ingness of a developed country such as the United States to subject itself
to measures that could result in legislative or policy changes-even if that
meant simply enforcing existing national labor laws-if the impetus for
that change originates from complaints initiated from Mexico.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its flaws-and there are many-the NAALC remains a historic
agreement, one that set a precedent in this hemisphere by incorporating
labor standards into free trade negotiations, even if not into the NAFTA
agreement itself. This article has analyzed the structure and operation of
NAALC and the NAOs, and has found that, practically speaking, the pro-
cess has resulted in unsatisfactory responses when the NAALC has been
used as a tool to address alleged labor rights violations of migrant work-
ers in the United States. As the two recent NAALC complaints demon-
strate, the NAALC has dealt with alleged violations of migrant workers'
rights in the U.S. through a process that deliberately avoids a confronta-
tion or litigious style. The traditional analysis of the NAALC's weak-
nesses tends to emphasize the Mexican government's opposition to
imposition of developed world labor standards through coercive mea-
sures. But I have argued in this article that the United States also op-
poses such measures, based on a desire to protect the traditional nature
of the labor rights relationship between the developed and developing
65. Brennan Center for Justice, Testimony of Representative George Miller, Chair-
man of the Education and Labor Committee before the Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and Inter-
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world. The United States wants to maintain the American labor system
as a model for the developing world and also to protect it from any
changes arising from complaints from that world. An important dilemma
can be seen here as well with respect to enforcing such rights within de-
veloping countries subject to an accord such as the NAALC. If a wealthy,
developed country such as the United States relies on the defense of in-
sufficient resources to deal with violations of internationally agreed-to la-
bor standards, how can the developing countries be expected to devote
sufficient resources to deal with similar problems?
The NAALC is an example of an inadequate compromise, an attempt
to address the conundrum of protecting labor rights within neo-liberal
economic globalization that often facilitates their exploitation. One posi-
tive result of the NAALC process has been greater cooperation and in-
clusiveness among various NGOs and civil society groups, including
previously marginalized groups such as unofficial Mexican unions and
Mexican migrant workers in the United States. The cooperative process
in dealing with migrant workers is most effective when used to approach
a theoretical legal problem and is clearly inadequate in confronting ongo-
ing violations of national labor laws. But the NAALC process, an exer-
cise in "soft law-making," is clearly not up to the task of dealing with the
"hard-law" realities of ensuring a state party's compliance with its own
national labor laws.
